Robert L. Velasquez, By and Through His Guardian Ad Litem, Corinne F. Muniz v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, A Utah Corporation; Heinz Reinhold and State of Utah, Public Commission : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
Robert L. Velasquez, By and Through His Guardian Ad Litem, 
Corinne F. Muniz v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, A Utah 
Corporation; Heinz Reinhold and State of Utah, Public 
Commission : Brief of Appellant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Felshaw King; Attorney for Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Valasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad, No. 11883 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4967 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. VELASQUEZ, By and 
Through His Guardian Ad Litem, 
CORINNE F. MUNIZ, · 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS.· 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMP ANY, A Utah Corporation;. 
HEINZ REINHOLD, Defenda.nts, 
and 
STATE OF UTAH, PUBLIC 
COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Resporuknt. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ease No. 
Jl883 
Appeal from the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake COtp1.t1', 
State of Utah 
Honorable Merrill C. Fau, Judge 
FELSHAW KING OF KING & KING 
251 East 200 South 
P.O. Box 220 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
A'lTORNEY FOR 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
By GARY A. FRANK 
Assiatl!lat Attorney General 
ltate Capitol 
lilt Lake City, Utah 
.CORNEY FOR RESPONDENT F LED ' ·1 , 1Cj;,c 
I.· ' ·' , '- . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Preliminary Statement ------------------------------------------------ 1 
Nature of Case ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
Disposition of Lower Court ---------------------------------------- 2 
Relief Sought on Appeal ------------------------------------------ 3 
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------ 3 
Argument ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Point I. 
The District Court Erred in Granting Motion for 
Judgment in Favor of the Public Service 
Comm1ss1on. ----------------------------------··-··--------·---------·-------- 6 
Conclusion --------------------------------------------------------------------·· 12 
AUTHORITIES CITED: 
Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 U.2d 350, 
353 P.2d 460 ---·--------------·----------····----·-----·-·····--·--·--9 
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11U.2d1, 35A P.2d 559 -----------·-·------··---··--·---··-----11 
Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 
368 P.2d 266 ---·----···---·----·------·-----·--------·---···--··---···--11 
1 
Page 
Gunn v. Ass'n. of Casualty & Ins. Executives 
(ED Tenn 1951) 16 FR Serv 56c.41, Case l .... 9 
Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 U 2d 303, 
293 Pac. 2d 700 .................................................... 9 
Reliable Furniture Co. Y. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. 
Und., Inc., 16 U.2d 2II, 398 P.2d 685 .............. 9 
Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (CA 5th, 
1962) 299 F.2d 525, 5 FR 2d 56c, 31 Case l .... 9 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U.2d 30, 395 
P.2d 62 -···························--------------·------------------······· 11 
STATUTES: 
63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .......... 2 
54-4-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 -------------------- 2, 6 
54-4-15 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------·--------- 2, 7 
TEXTS 
6 Moore's Federal Practice 2152, § 56.ll[2] ------------ 9 
6 Moore's Federal Practice 2285, § 56.15 [l.O] ........ 11 
11 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. VELASQUEZ, By and 
Through His Guardian Ad Litem, 
CORINNE F. MUNIZ, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD Case No. 
COl\IP ANY, A Utah Corporation; 11883 
HEINZ REINHOLD, Defendants, 
and 
STATE OF UTAH, PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Respo11dc11 t. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff will be referred to as such and Public 
Service Commission, State of Utah will be referred to 
as Defendant. All italics are added. 
1 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was severely injured when the vehicle 
in which he was asleep and riding as a passenger was 
struck by a Union Pacific Railroad Company train at 
a grade crossing in a residential area in Sandy, Utah 
on March 9, 1968. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint for recovery of dam- I 
ages on May 21, 1969 naming Defendant in his 
Cause of Action. Plaintiff's Complaint against De- I 
fendant was amended by filing an Amendment to Sec-
ond Cause of Action pursuant to Order of the Court 
on July 2, 1969. 
Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant is ground-
ed in negligence and is brought pursuant to and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act (63-30-1 et seq. U.C.A., 1953). 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges violation of statutory duty 
imposed upon Defendant by the provisions of 54-4-14, 
U.C.A., 1953 and 54-4-15 (2), U.C.A., 1953. 
Defendant filed Motion for Summary Judgment 
on August 4, 1969 and the lower Court granted Sum-
mary Judgment in favor of Defendant on September 
19, 1969. 
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RE.LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff .;eeks to have the Summary Judgment 
entered by the lower Court vacated and to have the case 
remanded to the lower Courf t for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 9, 1968 Plaintiff and two other boys 
were returning home after having been to a drive-iu 
movie. On the way home they were to pick up the older 
brother of one of the boys who had been visiting with 
his girlfriend in Sandy. The vehicle was being driven 
by Manuel Ortega. Plaintiff fell asleep during the 
movie and was asleep from the time they left the drive-
in until the time of the accident, which occurred at 400 
North and 100 East in Sandy, Utah. The driver was 
not acquainted with this area and had never traveled 
up 400 North either as a driver or a passenger and had 
no knowledge that there were any railroad crossings 
in the vicinity and there were no advanced railroad 
warning signs as they approached the crossing ( Depo-
sition of Manuel Ortega, July 3, 1969 pp. 7 -10) . 
The driver did not even know there was a railroad 
crossing in the area until just before his wheels went 
onto the tracks (Ortega Deposition p. 13). 
The only safety device at the grade crossing in 
this residential area was a faded out "crossbuck" which 
was hard to see (Ortega Deposition, p. 14), a view of 
which is reproduced below in black and white (Ortega 
Deposition, Exhibit No. 6). 
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An average of Thirty-six ( 36) trains per week 
passed over this crossing during the year preceding 
.March 9, 1968 (Union Pacific Railroad Company's 
Answers to Interrogatories, dated September 5, 1969, 
Answer 97). 
After Defendant filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit in Opposition to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. In Paragraph 
2 of that Affidavit, Plaintiff stated that he would "in-
troduce evidence intending to show and prove that 
Defendant State of Utah Public Service Commission 
was negligent in the fallowing particulars" which are 
paraphrased as follows: 
(a) That Defendant had no requirements for the 
periodic painting or maintenance of crossbucks. 
(b) That there were no advanced warning signs 
approaching the crossing. 
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( c) That Defendant negligently faile<l to pre-
scribe regulations to keep crossings free and dear of 
weeds, bushes, trees and other obstructions. 
( <l) That Defendant was, in fact, a ware of the 
deteriorated condition of the single sign at the grade 
crossing in question and had negligently failed to take 
appropriate steps to insure its replacement or repair. 
( e) That the volume of trains passing over the 
crossing weekly and the large volume of motor vehicle 
traffic through the crossing required the installation 
of automatic safety devices in order to protect the 
traveling public and it was negligent for the Pubiic 
Service Commission to fail to require the installation 
of automatic signaling devices and that these acts of 
negligence were the proximate cause of the accident 
resulting in Plaintiff's injuriei; and that the Defendant 
had breached its duty toward Plaintiff. 
That this Affidavit was available to the Court at 
the time the Court considered Defendant's .Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
At the time of hearing on the Motion, Defendant 
introduced, without objection from Plaintiff, a copy of 
Association of American Railroads, Bulletin No. ti, 
"Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Protection, Rec-
ommended Practices" and a copy of a resolution indicat-
ing that this pamphlet had been adopted by Defendant. 
This pamphlet merely describes the dimensions, colors 
and placement of signal devices with respect to distances 
from the road and tracks and in no way, prescribes rec-
ommendations or regulations for evaluation as to what 
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type of warning device, if any, should be placed at cer-
tain types of crossings after due diliberation with re-
spect to volume of railroad traffic, volume of highway 
traffic, population of surrounding area, character of 
crossing and other factors which must be considered to 
make such an evaluation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION. 
The Defendant Public Service Commission has a 
duty to protect the public by requiring proper and ade-
quate safety devices at railroad grade crossings. This 
duty is created by statute. 54-4-14, U.C.A., 1953 pro-
vides as fallows: 
Safety Appliances-Regulation. - The Com-
mission shall have power, by general or special 
orders, rules or regulations, or otherwise, to 
require every public utility to construct, main-
tain and operate its line, plant, system, equip-
ment, apparatus, tracks and premises in such 
manner as to promote and safeguard the health 
and safety of its employees, pasengers, customers 
and the public and to this end to prescribe, among 
other things, the installation, use, maintenance 
and operation of appropriate safety or other de-
vices or appliances, including interlocking and 
other protective devices at grade crossings or 
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junctions ,and block or other system of signaling, 
and to establish uniform or other standards of 
construction and equipment, and to require the 
performance of any other acts which the health 
or safety of its employees, passengers, customers 
or the public demand. 
The provisions of 54-4-15 (2), U.C.A., 1953 go 
even further to provide that the Commission shall have 
the exclusive power to provide for safety measures at 
grade crossings. That Section reads as follows: 
(2) "The Commission shall have the exclusive 
power to deteTmine and prescribe ahe manner, 
including the particular point of crossing and 
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, 
use and protection of each crossing of a public 
road or highway by a railroad .. , and of a street 
by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or abolish 
any such crossing, to restrict the use of such 
crossing to certain types of traffic in the interest 
of public safety ... ". 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had breached its 
duty and was negligent in the following particulars: 
(a) Negligently failing to provide for installation 
of adequate protective devices. 
( b) Negligently failing to establish a program to 
discover dilapidated signs which did not meet Defend-
ant's own standards and to provide for the repair or re-
placement of such signs. 
( c) That Defendant had previously been inform-
ed by the Utah Safety Council by letter of May 15, 
1967 that the Utah Insurance Agents Association had 
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made a survey of railroad crossing signs in the Salt 
Lake metropolitan area and had found many of them t() 
be unsafe with inadequate protective devices and that 
said letter of May 15, 1967 called particular attentioit 
to the problem of dilapidated crossbacks such as the one 
in existence at the grade crossing involved in this acci-
dent and that notwithstanding this notice, Defednaut 
negligently failed to formulate or implement adequate 
procedures to require the replacement or repair of such 
dilapidated "crossbucks" and particularly the one in 
question. 
(d) That Defendant negligently failed to fornrn-
late, prescribe and issue orders and standards relating to 
the maintenance of railroad grade crossings with respect 
to keeping the same clear of weeds, brush, bushes, trees 
and other obstructions. 
( e) That Defendant negligently failed to require 
installation or provide for the installation of advanced 
railroad warning signs to give warning of the presence 
of a railroad grade crossing. 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment stated that Plaintiff would proye 
that Defendant was negligent as alleged. 
All Defendant has shown is that it adopted Bulle-
tin No. 6 of the Association of American Railroads 
which does nothing more than describe the physical 
characteristics of certain types of safety devices. 
Defendant has not even filed an Answer in this 
case. Neither party has had an opportunity to engage 
in discovery. A Motion for Summary Judgment was 
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most certainly premature and at this stage of the pro-
ceed;ngs there is not one single shred of evidence in tlzc 
record to refute Plaintiff's allegations of Defendant's 
negligence, not even an Answer from Defendant. 
6 Moore's Federal Practice 2152, §56.11[2) provides: 
If the Motion is made by the Defendants 
solely on the basis of the Complaint, the Motion 
is functionally equivalent to a Motion to Dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) 
( 6) ; the Complaint should be liberally construed 
in favor of the Complainant; the facts alleged 
in the Complaint must be taken as true; and the 
Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied 
if a claim has been pleaded. Citing Smoot 'V. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (CA. 
5th, 1962) 299 Fed. 2d 525, 5 FR Serv 2d 56c. 
31, Case 1 and Gunn 'V. of Casualty & 
Surety Executives (ED, Tenn. 1951) 16 FR 
Serv 56c.41, Case 1. 
In Brandt vs. Springville Banking Company, 10 
Utah 2d 350, 353 Pac. 2d 460, this Court said: 
We are cognizant of the desirability of per-
mitting litigants to fully present their case to 
the Court and that a Summary Judgment pre-
vents this. For that reason Courts are, and 
should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy. Cit-
ing Holland vs. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 
Utah 2d 303, 293 Pac. 2d 700. 
The reasons for the Court's reluctance to grant 
Summary Judgments are clearly set forth in Reliable 
Furniture Co. vs. Fidelity 8$ Guaranty Insurance Und-
erwriters Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 Pac 2d 685, where 
this Court said : 
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It is appropriate to reiterate that the dismissal 
of an action at pretrial, which peremptorily turns 
a party out of Court, is a drastic action which 
should be used sparingly and with great caution 
* * * the summary disposal of a case serves a 
salutory purpose in avoiding the time, trouble 
and expense of a trial when it is justified. But 
unless it is clearly so, there are other evils to be 
guarded against. A party with a legitimate cause, 
but who is unable to afford an appeal, may be 
turned away without his day in Court; or, when 
an appeal is taken, if a reversal results and a 
trial is ordered, the time, trouble and expense 
is increased rather than diminished. It is to avoid 
these evils and to safeguard the right of access 
to the Courts for the enforcement of rights and 
a remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by a jury 
if desired, that it is of such importance that the 
Court should take care to see that the party ad-
versely affected has a fair opportunity to present 
his contentions against precipitate action which 
will deprive him of that privilege. His conten-
tions as to the facts should be considered in the 
light most favorable to him, and only if it clearly 
appears that he could not establish a right to re-
covery under the law should such action be htken; 
and any doubts which exist should be resolved 
in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial. 
The action in this case was even more "drastic" 
when we consider that the Motion was granted before 
any responsive pleadings were filed and before the 
parties could engage in discovery. 
A Summary Judgment must be supported by evi-
dence, admission and inference which, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the loser, show that there is 
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no genuine issue as to any material fact and such show-
;ng must preclude all reasonable possibility that the 
loser could have given a trial to produce evidence which 
would sustain a judgment in his favor, Thompson vs. 
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 Pac. 2d 62; Bull-
ock vs. Desert Dodge Truck Center Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 
354 Pac. 2d 559; Frederick May Company, Inc. vs. 
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 Pac. 2d 266. With respect to 
Summary Judgments in this particular type of action 
fi Moore's Federal Practice 2285, §56.15(1.-0] provides 
that Summary Judgment will normally not be warrant-
ed in an action based on negligence. 
J<..,or the purpose of considering the Motion for 
Summary Judgment the averments of Plaintiff's Com-
plaint must be taken as true and there is simply nothing 
whatsoever in the record to controvert such allegations 
let alone challenge such averments to the point of being 
able to conclude, when viewing the situation in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff, that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. This follows a fortiori 




The Summary Judgment should be vacated al!d 
the cause remanded to the lower Court for discovery 
proceedings and trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FELSHAW KING, Esquire 
KING & KING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
251 East 200 South 
P.O. Box 220 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: 825-2202 
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